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11 Introduction
In this paper we introduce and study three solution concepts for cooperative games with random
payoffs. An example of a cooperative situation with uncertain payoffs is the following. Two ﬁrms
will be temporarily working together in an R&D project. Although the proﬁt of this project is yet
uncertain, the ﬁrms sign a contract beforehand in which their proﬁt shares are written down.
Cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced in Timmer, Borm and Tijs (2000). In
thesegamesthepayofftoacoalitionisnotknownwithcertaintyandismodelledasa randomvariable.
Further, thepreferences oftheplayersandthepossibleallocationsofthepayoffsare ofaspeciﬁc type.
Another model of games where the payoffs to the coalitions are random variables is the model of
stochastic cooperative games as discussed in Suijs (2000). The difference between these games and
cooperative games with random payoffs lies in the assumptions on the preferences and the structure
of the set of possibleallocations of the payoffs (see Timmer et al. (2000)).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is a solution concept for cooperative TU games for which
several equivalent formulations exist. One of these formulations is that the Shapley value equals the
averageofthemarginalvectors. Suijs(2000)consideredthisformulationoftheShapleyvaluebutwas
not able to extend it to his model of stochastic cooperative games because, among others, a marginal
vector of a stochastic cooperative game need not be uniquely deﬁned. Nevertheless, the nucleolus,
a solution concept for TU games that we do not discuss here, has been successfully extended to
stochasticcooperative games (cf. Suijs (1996, 2000)).
Inspired by the equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for TU games we deﬁne three
solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs. These are the marginal value, the
dividend value and the selector value. We study properties of these solution concepts and give two
characterizations on subclasses of games. The ﬁrst one is on the class of games where all players
have identical preferences of a speciﬁc ‘linear’ type. On this class of games with random payoffs the
three solutionconcepts coincide. The second one is a characterization on the class of one-person and
two-persongames, whereagainthethreesolutionscoincide. Thesetwocharacterizationsarebasedon
characterizations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games by Young (1985), and by Myerson
(1980), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Ortmann (1998), respectively. Further, an example shows
that the solutionsmay all be different for three-person games.
This paper is organized in four sections. In section 2 we brieﬂy recall the main basic features of
cooperative games with random payoffs. The three solution concepts are introduced in section 3. In
section 4 properties of the solution concepts are studied and the two characterizations are provided.
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs that are omitted in the text.
2 Cooperative games with random payoffs
A cooperative game with random payoffs is a tuple (N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N). N is the ﬁnite
player set. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N. The nonnegative random payoff to coalitionS is
2denotedby R(S) and S is the set of coalitionswith a nonzero payoff. The set A contains all possible
individual payoffs that a player may receive from the coalitional payoffs and i is a function that
describes how player i compares two random payoffs. Below we explain these ingredients in more
detail.
Let N = f1;:::;ng. Denote by jSj the cardinality of coalition S.L e t L +be the set of all
nonnegative random variables with ﬁnite expectation. The payoff zero for sure is denoted by 0.
Notice that 0 2L +.
The payoff R(S)to coalitionS i sa s s u m e dt ob ea ne l e m e n to fL +.Sis the set of coalitionswith
a nonzero payoff, S = fS  NjR(S) 6=0 ;S6 =;g. We assume the following about the payoffs.
The reason for this assumption is explained in section 3.
Assumption 2.1 If R(T)=0for some coalition T then R(S)=0for all coalitions S such that
S  T.
An allocation of the payoff R(S) to the members of S is a multiple pR(S) with p 2 IR S and
where player i 2 S receives piR(S). Such an allocation is efﬁcient if
P
i2S pi =1 . For ease of
notation deﬁne (S)=f p2IR S j
P
i 2 S p i =1 g .T h es e tA=f pR(S)jS 2S ;p2IR g contains
all the payoffs that a player may receive from an allocation of the coalitional payoffs with respect to
S. All nonzero payoffs in A are denoted by A−0 = fpR(S) 2A j p6 =0 g .
The preference relation of player i is denoted by
%i and it has the following interpretation. If
X
%i Y thenagent i weaklyprefers X toY . If heisindifferentbetweenthem, X i Y ,t h e nY
%iX
and X
%i Y , and if he strictly prefers X to Y , X i Y then X
%i Y and not X i Y . We assume
the followingabout this preference relation.
Assumption 2.2 For all i 2 N there exists a surjective, coordinatewise strictly increasing and




T(t0)R(T) if and only if t  t0, for all S;T 2S ;t;t0 2 IR .
2. fi
S(0) = 0 for all S 2S .
Some examples of preference relations that satisfy this assumption are the following. Let E(X)
denote the expectation of X.I f X
%iYif and only if E(X)  E(Y ), X;Y 2A ,t h e nf i
S( t )=
t=E(R(S))for all S 2S ,i2N,t2IR , represents this preference relation. This type of preferences
is called ‘expectation preferences’.
A secondexample involvesquantilesofrandom variables. The i-quantileoftherandom variable
X is uX
i =s u p f t2IR j PrfX  tg i gwith 0 < i<1such that u
R(S)
i > 0 for all S 2S .
Deﬁne the (utility) function Ui : A!IR by Ui(X)=u X
 i if X  0 and Ui(X)=u X
1 −  i otherwise.
If X




these so-called ‘quantile preferences’. Notice that both expectation and quantile preferences have
linear functions fi
S for all S 2S ,t h a ti s ,f i
S( t )=tfi
S(1) for all t 2 IR .
3Deﬁne the function i : AA − 0 !IR by i(pR(S);qR(T)) = fi
T((fi
S)−1(p))=q.I t i s t h e
uniquenumber i 2 IR such that pR(S) i iqR(T),f o ra l li2N,pR(S) 2Aand qR(T) 2A − 0.
Further,deﬁnei(0;0) = 1. Wedonotdeﬁnei(pR(S);0),pR(S) 2A − 0,becauseitcan bederived
from assumption 2.2 that we have piR(S) i 0 if pi > 0 and 0 i piR(S) if pi < 0. Hence, there
exists no i 2 IR such that pR(S) i i  0=0 .
Some interestingand often used properties of the functions i, i 2 N, are given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.3 For all playersi 2 N it holds that i(hX;X)=hfor any h 2 IR , X 2A − 0.
If for player i 2 N the functionsfi
S, S 2S , are linear then
1. i(pR(S);qR(T))= pfi
T(1)=(qfi
S(1)) for all pR(S) 2Aand qR(T) 2A − 0,
2. pR(S)
%i qR(T)if and only if p=fi
S(1)  q=fi
T(1) for all pR(S);qR(T)2A .
Proof. Let i 2 N, h 2 IR and X 2A − 0 . By deﬁnition of i it holds that hX i i(hX;X)X.
Fromassumption2.2wederivethatthepreference relation
%i ismonotoneincreasingandthisimplies
that h = i(hX;X).
Secondly, let playeri have linear functionsfi








where the ﬁrst equality is by deﬁnition of i and the other equalities follow from the linearity of fi
S,
S 2S .F o rpR(S);qR(T)2Awe obtain
pR(S)





where the ﬁrst equivalence comes from assumption 2.2 and the second one from the linearity of the
functionsfi
S, S 2S .
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3 The marginal, dividend and selector values
The Shapley value for cooperative TU games is a solutionfor which several equivalent formulations
exist. Based on these formulations, we deﬁne three solutions for cooperative games with random
payoffs.
We start with some deﬁnitions. A cooperative TU game is a pair (N;v)where N = f1;:::;ng
is the ﬁnite set of players, v(;)=0and v(S) 2 IR is the worth of coalition S.L e t (N) be the
set of all bijections  : f1;:::;ng!Nof N, S
i = f(1);:::;(i)g,i=1 ;:::;n,a n dS 
0 =; .




(i)(v)=v ( S 
i)−v ( S 
i − 1) ;
4for i =1 ;:::;n. The Shapley value (v) is equal to the average of the marginal vectors:




for all i 2 N. For cooperative games withrandom payoffswe deﬁne marginal vectors as follows. Let
 2 (N) and G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N).D e ﬁ n eY 
 (1) = R(f(1)g),p l a y e r(1) receives













for i =2 ;:::;n.Y
(i)is the marginal contributionof player (i)to coalitionS
i−1. Thiscontribution
is the remainder of R(S
i ) after the players in S
i−1 received parts that they ﬁnd equivalent to their
marginal contributions. Assumption 2.1 is necessary to avoid situations where (k)(Y 
(k);R(S
i))
is not deﬁned, that is, where Y 
(k) 6=0and R(S
i )=0 . The marginal vector M corresponding to
permutation  2 (N) is that allocationof R(N) where player i receives a multiple of R(N) that is
equivalentfor him to Y 
i : M
i (G)=m 
i( G ) R ( N)with
m
i (G)= i( Y
i ;R(N));
for all i 2 N.L e tG Nbe the class of games (N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) with random payoffs and
with player set N. A solutionfor cooperative games withrandom payoffsis a functionΨ onGN such
that Ψ(G) is an allocation pR(N) for the game G 2G N.
In a straightforward way we deﬁne the marginal value3 m for cooperative games with random
















v ( S ) ; j S j=1 ;
j S j − 1

v ( S )−
P
T
(Sj Tj d T( v )

; j S j>1 :
Now the Shapley value of (N;v)can be written as
i(v)=
X
S : i 2 S
d S( v ) (3.2)
foralli 2 N. For acooperativegame withrandompayoffsGwedeﬁnethedividendpercapitadS(G)





R ( S ) ; j S j=1 ;







j 2 T j( d T( G ) ;R(S))
i
R(S); jSj > 1:
3In Timmer et al. (2000) this value is called the Shapley value. Here, we consider three values based on the Shapley
value for cooperative TU games. To avoid confusion,we have renamed this value as the marginal value.
5The dividend per capita of a one-person coalition is equal to its payoff. If S contains more than one
player then we start with its payoff R(S). Given a subset T of S, T 6= S, we give each player j 2 T
the dividend per capita dT(G) expressed as a multiple of R(S). After we have done so for all sets
T  S, T 6= S, we divide the remainder of R(S) by jSj to obtain the dividend per capita. The





S : i 2 S
 i( d S( G ) ;R(N))
#
R(N)
for all i 2 N.P l a y e rireceives the dividends per capita, expressed in multiples of R(N), of all the
coalitionsto which he belongs.
A third formulation is given by Derks, Haller and Peters (2000) who show that the Shapley value
is theaverage of theso-called selector vectors. Deﬁne 2N = fSjS  Ng and S(v)=j Sj d S( v ) ,t h e
dividendof coalition S. The function γ :2 Nn f;g ! N with γ(S) 2 S for all coalitionsS is called









S : γ ( S )=i
S(v)
for all i 2 N,p l a y e rireceives the dividends of those coalitions S for which γ(S)=i , and we have






For a cooperative game with random payoffs G deﬁne the dividendof coalition S, S(G),b y










j 2 T j(T(G)=jTj;R(S))
i
R(S); jSj > 1:
The dividend S(G) of a one-person coalition S is equal to its dividend per capita, namely R(S).
For coalitions S with more than one player we take a subset T of S. The dividend T(G) is divided
equally among the players in T.P l a y e r j 2 T receives the amount j(T(G)=jTj;R(S))R(S),
which is equivalent for him to T(G)=jTj. The dividend of coalition S is all that remains of R(S)
after the dividends of the subcoalitions T have been divided. The following lemma shows that the
dividend S(G) is closely related to the dividend per capita dS(G).
Lemma 3.1 S(G)=j S j d S( G )for all games G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) and any coalition
S.
Proof. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a cooperative game with random payoffs and let S
be a coalition. We show by inductionthat S(G)=j S j d S( G ) .
6If jSj =1then S(G)=R ( S )=d S( G )=j S j d S( G ) . Now assume that T(G)=j Tj d T( G )
























where the second equality follows from induction and the third equality from the deﬁnition of the
dividendper capita dS(G).
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S : γ ( S )=i
i(S(G);R(N)):











for all i 2 N.
A ﬁrst remark on these deﬁnitions is that a marginal vector need not be a selector vector, as
opposedto the case for cooperative TU games. Secondly, notice that Mγ(G) need not be an efﬁcient
allocation of R(N) even if G is a game where all the functions fi are linear. The example below
illustratesthis.
Example 3.2 Consider the game G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) where N = f1;2;3g and the
payoffs are R(f1g)=R ( f 2 g )=0 ,R ( f 3 g )=1 ,R ( f 1 ;2 g )=2 ,R ( f 1 ;3 g )=3 ,R ( f 2 ;3 g )=1
and R(N)  U([3;7]),t h a ti s ,R ( N)is uniformly distributed over the interval [3;7]. We see that
S = ff3g;f1;2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;Ngand A = fpR(S)jS 2S ;p2IR g by deﬁnition.
Let1 = 3 =1 = 2and2 =1 = 4 . Recallfromsection2thatuX
i =s u p f t2IR j PrfX  tg ig




i for all i 2 N, S 2S,t2IR . From this we obtain the maps i for all i 2 N.
Thedividendsofthevariouscoalitionsaref1g(G)= f 2 g( G )=0 , f 3 g( G )=1 , f 1 ; 2 g( G )=
2 , f 1 ; 3 g( G )=2 , f 2 ; 3 g ( G )=0and N(G)=− R ( N ) = 20. Consider the selector function γ
deﬁned by γ(fig)=i ,i2N,γ( f 1 ;2 g )=γ( f 1 ;3 g )=γ(N)=1and γ(f2;3g)=2 .T h e n
m
γ
1( G )= 1 (f1g(G);R(N))+ 1(f1;2g(G);R(N))+ 1(f1;3g(G);R(N))
+ 1(N(G);R(N))
=0 + 2 = 5+2=5−1=20 = 3=4;
m
γ
2(G)= 2 (f2g(G);R(N))+ 2(f2;3g(G);R(N)) = 0 + 0 = 0 and for player 3 m
γ
3(G)=
 3 (f3g(G);R(N)) = 1=5. The correspondingselector vector Mγ(G)=( 3 = 4 ;0 ;1 = 5)R(N)is not
7an efﬁcient allocation of R(N). In fact, all the selector vectors in this example are not efﬁcient but
the selector value is an efﬁcient allocation of R(N) (this is a corollary of theorem 4.4).
3
4 Properties and characterizations on subclasses of games
Inthissectionwepresentpropertiesofthesolutionconceptsthatweintroducedintheprevioussection.
For two subclasses of games where the three solution concepts coincidewe provide characterizations
of these solutions.
Let GN be a set of games (N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) with player set N. A solution concept Ψ
on GN
(i) is called efﬁcient if for all G 2G N,Ψ(G)=pR(N) for some p 2 (N).
(ii) is called symmetric if for all G 2G N,f o ra l li;j 2 N such that i = j and R(S [f i g )=
R ( S[f jg )for all S  N nf i;jgwe have Ψi(G)=Ψ j( G ) .
( iii) satisﬁes anonymity if for all G 2G Nand for all  2 (N) we have Ψ(G)=  (Ψ(G))
where G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(
i )i2N), R((U)) = R(U), S = f(S)jS 2S g ,
A =f pR(S)jp 2 IR ;S2S g , 
 ( i )= iand ((pR(N)))(i) = piR(N) for i 2 N and
p 2 IR N .
( iv) satisﬁes the null player property if for all G 2G N,f o ra l li2Nsuch that R(fig)=0and
R(S)=R ( Snf i g )for all coalitionsS 6= fig we have Ψi(G)=0 .
The three solutionconcept satisfy most of these properties.
Lemma 4.1 The marginal value m and the dividend value d are efﬁcient, symmetric, and they
satisfy anonymity and the null player property. The selector value s is symmetric and satisﬁes
anonymityand the null player property.
Proof. We only show the efﬁciency of d. The remainder of the proof is left to the reader.
Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a game with random payoffs. The dividend per capita
of coalition N is by deﬁnition








 j( d T( G ) ;R(N))
3
5R(N):







































where thelastequalityfollowsfrom (4.3). We concludethatd isan efﬁcient allocationof R(N).
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We introduce another property based on its counterpart for TU games as in Young (1985).
(v) A solution concept Ψ on GN satisﬁes strong monotonicity if for all i 2 N and for all games
G;G0 2G Nsuch that4 M
i (G)
%i M
i (G0) for all  2 (N) we have Ψi(G)
%i Ψi(G0).
Now we have the followingresult.
Lemma 4.2 The marginal value m satisﬁes strongmonotonicityon the class of all games G where
fi is a linear functionfor all i 2 N.
Proof. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) and G0 =( N;(Q(S))S2S0;A0;(i)i2N) be games





for all permutations .I f R ( N )=Q ( N )=0then m
i (G)= m
i( G 0 )=0because m is an











for all permutations  where variables without (with) an accent refer to the game G (G0). Applying
statement 2 of lemma 2.3 gives
i(Y 
i ;R(N))=fi
N(1)  i(Y 0
i ;Q(N))=f0i
N(1)
for all  2 (N).T h i si m p l i e st h a t



























i ( G 0) :
4We assume w.l.o.g. that the domains of the preference relations
%i and of the functions i, i 2 N, can be extendedto
include all possibleindividual payoffs in both games.
9Similar reasoning shows that this result also holds if R(N)=0and Q(N) 6=0or if R(N) 6=0and
Q(N)=0 .
2
The followingexample showsthatthis resultneed nothold if one of the functionsfi is not linear.
Example 4.3 Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) and G0 =( N;(Q(S))S2S0;A0;(i)i2N)be two
games with N = f1;2g. Variables with accents refer to the game G0. The payoffs are such that
R(f1g) 1 1=10R(N), R(f2g) 1 4=5R(N), Q(f1g) 1 1=10Q(N) and Q(f2g) 1 4=5Q(N).
Let i denote the permutation with i(1) = i and i(2) = 3 − i, i =1 ; 2 . The marginal vectors
are M1(G)=( 1 = 10;9=10)R(N), M2(G)=( 1 = 5 ;4 = 5)R(N), M1(G0)=( 1 = 10;9=10)Q(N)
and M2(G0)=( 1 = 5 ;4 = 5)Q(N). Then the marginal values are m(G)=( 3 = 20;17=20)R(N)and
m(G0)=( 3 = 20;17=20)Q(N).
We concentrate on player 1. Let f1
N and f01









From item 1 of assumption2.2 and from f1
N(9) = 1=10, f01
N(8) = 1=10 and 9 > 8 it follows that
M
1
1 (G)=1 = 10R(N) 1 1=10Q(N)=M
 1
1 ( G 0) :
Similarly we obtain M
2
1 (G) 1 M
2
1 (G0). Hence, for player 1 we have M
1 (G) 1 M
1 (G0) for all
permutations. Once againby assumption2.2 and by f01
N(12) = 3=20, f1
N(11) = 3=20and 12 > 11
we get
m
1 (G0)=3 = 20Q(N) 1 3=20R(N)= m
1( G ) :
We conclude that the marginal value does not satisfy strong monotonicity.
3
The selector value and the dividend value are equal for games where all the players i 2 N have
linear functions fi.
Theorem 4.4 If G is a game where all the players have linear functions fi then the selector value
and the dividend value coincide.
Proof. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a game where fi is a linear function for all i 2 N.
From lemma 3.1 we know that S(G)=j S j d S( G )for all coalitionsS. By the linearityof fi and by









































i( G ) ;




Denote by GLI N the set of games G with player set N where all the players have identicallinear
functionsfi. The marginal, dividendand selector value coincide on this class of games.
Theorem 4.5 For all G 2 GLI N we have m(G)= d( G )= s( G ) .
Proof. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) 2 GLI N. From theorem 4.4 we know that d(G)=
 s( G ) . It remains to show that m(G)= d( G ) .
If R(N)=0then m
i (G)= d
i( G )=0for all i 2 N because these values are multiples of
R(N)=0 .
If R(N) 6=0then deﬁne f = fi, i 2 N. Also, deﬁne a corresponding cooperative TU game
(N;v)by v(S)=0if R(S)=0 ,v ( S )=1 =fS(1) if R(S) 6=0for all coalitions S and v(;)=0 .
Let  2 (N) be a permutation of N. We show by induction that m(G)=m ( v ) =v(N).F o r







where thesecondequalityfollowsfrom statement1of lemma 2.3. For R(f(1)g)=0thisresultalso
holds because (1)(0;R(N)) = 0 = m



































=( v ( S 



















i )fori =2 ;:::;k,k<n . Usinginduction
we obtain for R(S
k+1) 6=0
Y




























































































(k+1) =0because it is a multiple of R(S
k+1).A l s o , R ( S 
j )=0for all
j  k +1by assumption 2.1 and so m
(k+1)(G)=0=m 
 ( k +1)(v)=v(N). We have shown by
inductionthat m(G)=m ( v ) =v(N).
Similar reasoning as for themarginal vectors showsthat i(dS(G);R(N)) = dS(v)=v(N)for all


















and by (3.1) and (3.2)
m
















i ( G )
for all players i 2 N.
2
Furthermore, there exists a characterization of these solution concepts on the class of games
GLI N. This characterization is based on a characterization of the Shapley value for cooperative TU
games by Young (1985).
Theorem 4.6 Themarginalvaluem istheuniquesolutionconceptonGLI N thatsatisﬁesefﬁciency,
symmetry and strongmonotonicity.
Proof. From the lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 it follows that m satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry and strong
monotonicityon GLI N.
To show the uniqueness,let Ψ be a solutionconcept on GLI N that satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry
and strong monotonicity. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) 2 GLI N and let (N;v) be the
corresponding TU game as in the proof of lemma 4.5. By efﬁciency there is a p 2 (N) such
that Ψ(G)=pR(N).D e ﬁ n e   ( v )=p i v ( N )for all i 2 N.T h i s   is a solution concept on the
class of TU games SGN = f(N;v)jv  0;v ( T )=0)v ( S )=0for all S  Tg.F u r t h e r ,
  satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry and strong monotonicity as deﬁned for cooperative TU games by
Young (1985). In theorem A.1 of the appendix we show that the Shapley value  is the unique
solution on SGN that satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Hence,  (v)= ( v )
and Ψ(G)= ( v ) =v(N) R(N)= m( G )if v(N) 6=0 .I fv ( N )=0then we have R(N)=0 .B y
efﬁciency and symmetry we have Ψi(G)=0= m
i ( G )for all i 2 N.
2
We will now turn our attention to games with random payoffs that need not have linear functions
fi, i 2 N. The subgame of G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) restricted to coalitionT is denoted by
GT =( T;(R(S))S2ST;AT;(i)i2T) with ST = fS 2S j ST g ,A T =f pR(S) 2A j ST g .
Let  GN = [M22Nnf;gGM be the class of cooperative games with random payoffs and player set
N, and all of its subgames. A sixth property for solution concepts on  GN is based on the balanced
contributionsproperty for cooperative TU games by Myerson (1980).
(vi) A solution concept Ψ on  GN is said to have balanced contributions if for all games G 2G N,
for all coalitions T  N and for all i;j 2 T, i 6= j,w eh a v e
 i(Ψi(GT);R(T))− i(Ψi(GTnfjg);R(T))
= j(Ψj(GT);R(T))− j(Ψj(GTnfig);R(T)):
We have the followingresults concerning two-persongames.
Lemma 4.7 If G is a two-person game then m(G)= d( G )= s( G ) , the three solutionconcepts
coincide. These solutionshave balanced contributionson  GN with jNj =2 .
13Proof. Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a two-person game with N = f1;2g.I fR ( N )=0
then R(f1g)=R ( f 2 g )=0by assumption 2.1. For any of the two permutations  we have
M
(1) = (1)(R(f(1)g);R(N))R(N)=  (1)(0;0)R(N)=1R ( N)(= 0)
M
(2) =( 1 −   (1)(0;0))R(N)=0R(N)(= 0)
and the average of these marginal vectors is m(G)=( 1 = 2 ;1 = 2)R(N)=( 0 ;0). In a similar way
we can show that d(G)= s( G )=( 0 ;0)because these are also multiplesof R(N)=0 .
Now assume that R(N) 6=0 .L e t  1 (1) = 1, 1(2) = 2, 2(1) = 2 and 2(2) = 1.T h e
correspondingmarginal vectors are
M1(G)=(  1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N));1− 1(R(f1g);R(N)))R(N)
M2(G)=( 1− 2( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N)); 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N)





1 − 1(R(f1g);R(N))+ 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N):
The dividends per capita are dfig(G)=R ( f i g ) ,i=1 ;2 , for the one-person coalitions and for the
grand coalition dN(G)=1






















2( G ) .
There are only two selector functions, namely γ1 and γ2 deﬁned by γ1(fig)=γ 2 ( f i g )=i ,
i2N ,γ 1 ( N )=1and γ2(N)=2 . The dividends are fig(G)=R ( f i g ) ,i=1 ; 2 ,a n d
 N ( G )=( 1− 1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N)))R(N). This leads to
m
γ1
1 (G)= 1 (f1g(G);R(N))+ 1(N(G);R(N))
= 1(R(f1g);R(N))+ 1 − 1(R(f1g);R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N))
=1 −  2 ( R ( f 2 g ) ;R(N));
m
γ1
2 = 2(f2g(G);R(N)) = 2(R(f2g);R(N)) and so, Mγ1(G)=M  2( G ) . Analogously, for
selector function γ2 we have Mγ2(G)=M  1( G ) . We conclude that the selector value s(G),t h e
average of the selectorvectors, coincides with themarginal value m(G), the average of the marginal
vectors.
Finally, we check balanced contributions for the grand coalition N. By efﬁciency m
i (Gfig)=




=( 1+ 1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N)))=2− 1(R(f1g);R(N))




14We conclude that m has balanced contributions.
2
Moreover, we have the following characterization, which is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) and Ortmann (1998).
Theorem 4.8 The marginal value m is the unique solution concept on  GN with jNj =2that is
efﬁcient and has balanced contributions.
Proof. Let jNj =2 . By deﬁnition, m is efﬁcient and from lemma 4.7 it follows that m has
balanced contributionson  GN.
To show the uniqueness, let Ψ be a solution concept on  GN that is efﬁcient and has balanced
contributions. If G 2  GN is a one-person game then Ψ(G)= m( G )because of efﬁciency.
Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be a two-person game. By efﬁciency there exists a vector
p =( p 1;p 2)2 (N)such that Ψ(G)=( p 1;p 2)R(N).N e x tt ot h i s ,Ψhas balanced contributions:
1(Ψ1(G);R(N))− 1(Ψ1(Gf1g);R(N))
= 2(Ψ2(G);R(N))− 2(Ψ2(Gf2g);R(N)):
By efﬁciency we have Ψi(Gfig)=R ( f i g )for i 2 N. Together with Ψ(G)=( p 1 ;p 2)R(N)this
gives
p1 − 1(R(f1g);R(N))= p2 − 2(R(f2g);R(N)):
Using p1 + p2 =1leads to
2p1 =1+ 1( R ( f 1 g ) ;R(N))− 2(R(f2g);R(N))
from which we conclude that Ψ= m.
2
Of course, this characterization also holds for the dividend value and the selector value, as
lemma 4.7 indicates. For three-person games, the three solution concepts can all be different, as the
followingexample shows.
Example 4.9 Let G =( N;(R(S))S2S;A;(i)i2N) be the three-person game with N = f1;2;3g,
R(fig)=0for all i 2 N, R(S)=1if jSj =2and R(N) is uniformly distributed over the closed






t; jSj =2 ;
2 t=5;S = N;t  0;
t1=6=2;S = N;t > 0:
For this game the four solutionconcepts are
m(G)=( 1 9 = 60;11=30;19=60)R(N);
d(G)=( 7 = 15− (1=2)1=6=3;1=15+ 2(1=2)1=6=3;7=15− (1=2)1=6=3)R(N);
s(G)=( 7 = 15− (1=2)1=6=3;17=30− (1=2)1=6=3;7=15− (1=2)1=6=3)R(N):
15Notice that the selector value is not efﬁcient. Further, s
i(G)= d
i( G )for i =1 ;3 . This is due to
the fact that both the players 1 and 3 have expectation preferences and so, linear functions fi.T h e
inequalitys
2(G) 6= d
2( G )comes from the preferences of player 2: f1;2g(G)=1 21 = 2R ( N)
and df1;2g(G)=1 = 2 2(1=2)7=6R(N). Therefore,
2(f1;2g(G);R(N))= 1=2 < 2(1=2)7=6 =2  2( d f 1 ; 2 g ( G ) ;R(N))
althoughf1;2g(G)=2 d f 1 ; 2 g( G ) .
3
A Appendix
In this appendix we provide a characterization of the Shapley value on the class of TU games
SGN = f(N;v)jv  0;v ( T )=0)v ( S )=0for all S  Tg. This characterization is inspired by
thecharacterizationof theShapley valueon theclassof superadditivegames byYoung(1985)andwe
use it in the proof of theorem 4.6.
Let CN be a set of TU games with player set N and let   be a solution concept on CN,t h a ti s ,
  ( v )2IR N for all v 2 CN.T h e n satisﬁes
(a) efﬁciency if
P
i2N  (v)=v ( N)for all v 2 CN.
(b) symmetry if for all i;j 2 N such that v(S [f i g )=v ( S[f jg )for all S  N nf i;jg(i and j
are symmetric players)w eh a v e  i( v)=  j( v )for all v 2 CN.
(c) strongmonotonicityifforalli 2 N and for all games v;w 2 CN such thatv(S[fig)−v(S)
w(S[f i g )−w ( S)for all S  N, i= 2S ,w eh a v e  i( v)  i( w ) .
Theorem A.1 The Shapley value  is the unique solutionon SGN that satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry
and strong monotonicity.
In the proof of this theorem we need a lemma that we present below. First, we introduce some





1 ;S  T;
0; otherwise;
for all S  N. The unanimity games f(N;uT)jT 2 2N n f;gg form a basis of the class of all TU






For t 2f 1 ;:::;ngdeﬁne t(v) = maxT:jTj=tT(v).L e t v 1=
P
T 6 = ; j T j ( v ) u T . Clearly, v1 is
symmetric, that is, v1(S1)=v 1( S 2)for all coalitionsS1;S 2such that jS1j = jS2j.
16Let T(v)= j Tj( v )− T( v )( 0). Now we can write




Deﬁne the index k(v)=jfTjT(v) > 0gj. Suppose player i 2 N is such that
i= 2\ T:  T( v ) > 0T
and deﬁne the game wi = v +
P
T6=;;i= 2T T(v)uT. The following lemma shows that v 2 SGN
implies wi 2 SGN and that k(v) − 1 is an upper bound of k(wi).
Lemma A.2
1. v 2 SGN ) wi 2 SGN
2. k(wi)  k(v)− 1
Proof. Let v 2 SGN. Clearly, wi  0. It remains to show that
wi(Q)=0)w i( S )=0for all S  Q: (A.5)
Let Q be a coalitionsuch that
wi(Q)=v ( Q )+
X
T6 = ;;i= 2T
T(v)uT(Q)=0 :
Because v(Q), T(v) and uT(Q) are all nonnegativenumbers we have v(Q)=0and uT(Q)=0for
all coalitions T with i= 2T .F r o m v2SGN we get v(S)=0for all S  Q.A l s o , u T ( Q )=0
implies that Q 6 T.B u tt h e nS6 T for all S  Q and so, uT(S)=0 . We conclude that (A.5) is
satisﬁed.
To show the second item, notice that


























 T( v ) ;i 2 T;
jTj(v);i = 2 T:
It readily follows that
t(wi) = max
T:jTj=t
T(wi)= t( v )
17for all t 2f 1 ;:::;ng.F u r t h e r m o r e ,




 T( v ) ;i 2 T;
0;i = 2 T:
Now we get
k(wi)=jfTjT(wi) > 0gj
= jfTjT(v) > 0;i2T gj
j f T j  T ( v ) > 0 gj − 1
= k(v)− 1
where the inequalityfollows from i= 2Tfor at least one coalition T with T(v) > 0.
2
Now we can prove the characterization of the Shapley value on the class SGN.
Proof of theorem A.1. It is obvious that the Shapley value  satisﬁes efﬁciency, symmetry and
strong monotonicityon SGN.
Let v 2 SGN,t h e nv=
P
T6 = ; T( v) u T.D e ﬁ n ef o rt=1 ;:::;n
 t(v) = max
T:jTj=t
T(v); and T(v)= j Tj( v )− T( v )( 0):
Let v1 =
P
T6=; jTj(v)uT. Now we can write




Deﬁne the index k(v)=jfTjT(v) > 0gj.L e tgbe a solution on SGN that is efﬁcient, symmetric
and stronglymonotonic. We show by inductionon k(v) that g(v)= ( v ) .
If k(v)=0then v = v1. Because v1 is a symmetric game, all the players in N are symmetric.
From efﬁciency and symmetry we obtaingi(v)=v ( N) =n = i(v) for all i 2 N.
Now assume that g(v)= ( v )for all games v 2 SGN with k(v)  k − 1, for some positive
integer k.L e tv2SGN be a game with k(v)=k .D e ﬁ n eD=\ T6 = ; ;T(v)>0T.
First, let i 2 N n D. Deﬁne the game (N;wi)by




According to (A.6) we can rewrite this to




By lemma A.2 wi 2 SGN and k(wi)  k(v) − 1=k−1 .T h e n
g ( w i )= ( w i) (A.7)
by induction.
18Let coalition S be such that i= 2S .T h e n
v ( S[f i g )−v( S)=v 1 ( S [f i g )−
X
T6 = ;
 Tu T( S[f i g )−
0
@ v 1( S)−
X
T6 = ;
 Tu T( S)
1
A
= v 1( S[f i g )−v 1( S)−
X
T6 = ;
 T( v)( u T(S[f i g )−u T( S))
= v1(S [f i g )−v 1( S)−
X
T6 = ; ;i2T
T(v)( u T(S[f i g )−u T( S))
= wi(S [f i g )−w i( S) :
From strong monotonicity we obtain gi(v)=g i( w i)and i(v)= i( w i ) . Together with (A.7) this
gives gi(v)= i( v ) .
Second, let i;j 2 D be two players and let S  N nf i;jg. Then by deﬁnition
v(S [f i g )=v 1( S[f i g )−
X
T6 = ;
 T( v) u T( S[f i g ) :
Because uT(S [f i g )=u T ( S[f j g )=0for all coalitions T with T(v) > 0 and because
v1(S [f i g )=v 1( S[f jg ) , the game v1 is symmetric, we get
v(S [f i g )=v 1( S[f jg )−
X
T6 = ;
 T( v) u T( S[f jg )=v ( S[f jg ) :
Any two players in D are symmetric players in v. By symmetry gi(v)=g j( v )and i(v)= j( v )
for all i;j 2 D. Together with efﬁciency and with gk(v)= k( v )for all k 2 N n D this implies
gi(v)= i( v )for all i 2 D.
2
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